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We analyze the asymptotic security of the family of Gaussian modulated Quantum Key Distri-
bution protocols for Continuous Variables systems. We prove that the Gaussian unitary attack is
optimal for all the considered bounds on the key rate when the first and second momenta of the
canonical variables involved are known by the honest parties.
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In 1984 Bennet and Brassard introduced the concept of
Quantum Cryptography and presented the first Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD) protocol: BB84 [1]. The origi-
nal idea was that in Quantum Mechanics, and contrary
to Classical Physics, the observation of a system invari-
ably perturbs the system under observation. Therefore,
if two honest parties, Alice and Bob, establish a quan-
tum channel and use it to send information, an eaves-
dropper’s presence could be detected by analyzing how
the noise-free channel has changed. It was then shown
that QKD protocols are completely secure against any
eavesdropping attacks as long as the bit error rates do
not exceed a certain value (see for instance [2] and ref-
erences therein). In the meantime, new applications of
Quantum Mechanics to certain information tasks started
to develop: coin tossing, dense coding, teleportation...
All these results first appeared in the context of dis-
crete systems, but many of them were later translated
into the language of Continuous Variables (CV) systems.
This is per se an interesting theoretical problem. How-
ever, the main motivation for dealing with these systems
comes from a practical point of view: although the set of
feasible operations is reduced, the so-called Gaussian op-
erations are easy to implement and amazingly precise.
Quantum cryptography with continuous variables sys-
tems [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] was the most immediate result:
the transmission of coherent or squeezed pulses of light,
together with homodyne measurements, allows perform-
ing QKD with very high key rates [9].
The security analysis of these new protocols is not
straightforward. First of all, the commonly used reconcil-
iation and privacy amplification protocols are designed to
correct and distill secret bits from binary random vari-
ables, although some have been adapted to continuous
variables [10, 11]. Second, the dimension of the Hilbert
space on which the CV systems are defined is infinite
in theory, which makes a complete tomography impossi-
ble in principle, thus preventing Alice and Bob to know
precisely the state they are actually sharing. Therefore,
security proofs for CV protocols have to consider the op-
timal attack by Eve when Alice and Bob know their state
is in some set, usually defined by the momenta of the
quadratures up to second order [12]. In her search for
information, Eve’s possible attacks can be classified in
three different types [13]: individual attacks, where Eve
interacts individually with the sent states and measures
them individually before public reconciliation; collective
attacks, where Eve applies the same unitary individual
attack over the sent states, but performs her (possibly
collective) measurements at any time during Alice and
Bob’s reconciliation protocol and coherent attacks, where
Eve is allowed to perform any unitary collective interac-
tion over the sent states and any measurement strategy
at any time she wants. The latter is the most general
attack Eve can use. Most of the present security proofs
give necessary and sufficient conditions for key distilla-
tion when Eve is restricted to perform an individual [4, 5]
or finite-size coherent attack [12]. General proofs of se-
curity are given in [3] for a squeezed-state protocol and
in [14, 15] for coherent states.
Recently, bounds on extractable key rates have been
derived for the case of collective [16, 17] and general at-
tacks [18]. These bounds are easy to adapt to a wide
class of protocols, since they correspond to the differ-
ence of smooth entropies, which tend to Von Neuman or
Shannon entropies in the asymptotic case. In this work
we analyze a family of CV protocols based on Gaussian
modulation. This family includes most of the protocols
in the field of CV systems, such as those of Refs. [5] us-
ing squeezed light, or those of Refs. [6, 8] that employ
coherent states. We prove that for all of them, the Gaus-
sian attack is the unitary attack by Eve that minimizes
the bounds on the key rate of [16, 17], when Alice and
Bob know the quadrature momenta of their state up to
the second order. Therefore, Gaussian attacks turns out
to be optimal for these protocols.
We consider quantum systems of n canonical de-
grees of freedom, called modes, belonging to B(H(Rn)).
These are characterized by the set of operators ~Ξ =
(Ξ1, · · · ,Ξ2n) = (Q1, P1, · · · , Qn, Pn) satisfying the
canonical commutation relations [Ξj ,Ξk] = i(σn)jk,
2where σn is is the n-mode symplectic matrix,
σn =
n⊕
i=1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (1)
A state is said to be Gaussian iff its density matrix, ρ˜, is
the exponential of a quadratic function f on the canonical
operators of the system, i.e.,
ρ˜ = exp [−f(~Ξ)]. (2)
Because of their simple structure, any Gaussian state can
be completely described in terms of its displacement vec-
tor, d, and its covariance matrix, γ, both defined as
dk = 〈Ξk〉 = tr(ρΞk)
γkl = tr (ρ{Ξk − dk,Ξl − dl}+) ,
(3)
where {}+ denotes the anti-commutator. Therefore,
Gaussian states are characterized just by the first and
second order momenta of the canonical variables ~Ξ.
Gaussian operations are completely positive (CP) maps
that map Gaussian states into Gaussian states.
The considered CV QKD protocols are based on ran-
dom Gaussian modulation of squeezed or coherent states
of light [5, 6, 8]. They are prepare and measure (P&M )
protocols, suitable to realistic implementation with to-
day’s technology. However, for any P&M measure pro-
tocol there exists a completely equivalent entanglement-
based scheme [19]. This description simplifies the theo-
retical analysis, even if it would be more difficult to imple-
ment experimentally. The entanglement-based scheme
consists of the following five steps (see also [20]): 1) Al-
ice prepares a two-mode squeezed state. 2) She performs
a measurement over the first mode. This measurement
projects the second mode into a randomly displaced (pos-
sibly squeezed) state. If Alice performs a heterodyne
measurement, she effectively prepares a coherent state
on the second mode. If she randomly chooses to perform
a homodyne measurement on Q or P , she is effectively
preparing a randomly displaced squeezed state. 3) She
sends the second mode to Bob via a noisy quantum chan-
nel. 4) Bob receives the state sent by Alice. He performs
either a homodyne measurement in Q or P , or a het-
erodyne measurement, his result being y. 5) Alice and
Bob apply one-way Error Correction (EC) and Privacy
Amplification (PA) codes to distill a perfect secret key.
If the classical communication flows from Alice to Bob,
we speak about Direct Reconciliation (DR). On the con-
trary, if it is Bob who sends the classical information to
Alice during the reconciliation process, we say they are
using a Reverse Reconciliation (RR) protocol [21].
Recently, general bounds on the extractable key rate
under collective attacks have been published [16, 17].
All of them exploit the entanglement-based picture, but
of course they also apply to the corresponding P&M
scheme. They are expressed in terms of entropy quan-
tities. Throughout this work, the same notation H is
used for the (classical) Shannon entropy and the (quan-
tum) Von Neuman entropy. Let X (Y ) be the random
variable associated to Alice’s (Bob’s) measured quantity
and by x (y) its value. According to [16, 17], the key rate
K obtained using Direct Reconciliation is bounded by
K ≥ I(X : Y )− χ(X : E) ≡ Kcoll. (4)
Here I(X : Y ) denotes the classical mutual information,
I(X : Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X), while χ refers to the Holevo
bound [22],
χ(X : B) = H(B)−H(B|X), (5)
where H(B|X) =
∑
x p(x)H(B|X = x). Formally, I
and χ look identical, but they refer to different type of
variables. While the mutual information only deals with
classical random variables, the Holevo bound quantifies
the accessible classical information on quantum states.
This justifies the different notation.
Suppose now that Bob is allowed to use a collective
arbitrary measurement on many copies of the received
states. Of course, this is a rather unrealistic scenario,
but it provides an upper bound to the maximum one-way
secret key rate when Bob is free to perform any individ-
ual measurement. If, again, Eve is restricted to apply
collective attacks, the key rate, upon Bob optimizing his
measurement, is given by [16]:
K ≥ χ(X : B)− χ(X : E) ≡ K ′coll. (6)
In these two bounds, namely Eqs. (4) and (6), the first
term specifies the correlation between the honest par-
ties. It quantifies the amount of classical information
Alice and Bob should exchange to correct their errors.
The second term estimates Eve’s knowledge on Alice (or
Bob’s) variable. It is thus related to the amount of pri-
vacy amplification required to make Eve’s information
vanishing.
Eve’s attack has to be defined in order to compute the
secret key rate and needs therefore to be optimized. In-
deed, after the estimation strategy, Alice and Bob have
some knowledge about their state, this information being
denoted by g. In the calculation of key rates, as for any
other interesting function, Alice and Bob should mini-
mize (4) or (6) over the set G, consisting of all states ρ
compatible with g (see also [23]).
In the CV scenario, it is natural to take g, i.e., Al-
ice and Bob’s information on their state, as the first and
second moments on the measured quadratures. The first
order correlations do not play any role in the discussion,
as they can be changed arbitrarily by the use of local
unitaries. As shown in the next lines, for fixed second
(and first) moments, the corresponding Gaussian state
optimizes the bounds on the key rates given above. In-
terestingly, the Gaussian attack turns out to maximize
3Eve’s information as well, χ(X : E). Before proceed-
ing with the proof of these results, we spend some lines
clarifying the notation used from now and on.
Let ρ ∈ B(H2) be a density matrix in any Hilbert space
H. Then ρ˜ denotes the corresponding density matrix of
a Gaussian state characterized by the same covariance
matrix and displacement vector as ρ. Analogously, if
p (~x) is a probability distribution, then p˜ (~x) (or p˜ for
short) denotes the Gaussian probability distribution with
the same first and second momenta as p (~x). Moreover,
if F (~x) represents any quantity concerning a variable ~x,
described by a certain distribution p (~x), then F˜ has to
be understood as the same functional F calculated from
the distribution p˜. ∆˜F will be a shorthand notation for
the difference of these two quantities, ∆˜F = F˜ − F .
Three results are used in what follows. First, let ρ ∈
B(H2) be any physical state of a system A and ρ¯ the one
into which ρ is transformed after the measurement of the
classical variableX . The measurement is defined by a set
of positive operators {Mx}x obeying
∑
x dxMxM
†
x = I.
One has
ρ¯ =
∑
x
|x〉〈x|dxMxρM
†
x =
∑
x
p (x)dx|x〉〈x|dx⊗ρ|x , (7)
where ρ|x is the normalized state of ρ knowing X = x,
ρ|x =
MxρM
†
x
p (x)
, (8)
and p (x) = tr(MxρM
†
x). It is straightforward to check
that
H(A|X) = H(A¯)−H(X), (9)
where H denotes the Shannon entropy for the measure-
ment outcomes, i.e., H(X) = −
∑
x p (x)dx log(p (x)dx),
H(A¯) = −trρ¯ log ρ¯ is the von Neumann entropy of the
measured quantum state ρ¯ and the conditional entropy
H(A|X) is
∑
x p (x)dxS(ρ|x). In the case of continu-
ous variables, this expression is not bounded in the limit
dx→ 0. Therefore, we will only take such limit (if neces-
sary) for the computation of the final mutual (or Holevo)
information quantities, which stay finite.
Second, for any state ρ, one has [24]
∆˜H(A) = H(ρ‖ρ˜) ≥ 0, (10)
where H(ρ‖ρ˜) denotes the relative entropy
H(ρ‖ρ˜) = tr(ρ log ρ)− tr(ρ log ρ˜). (11)
Note that since the relative entropy is never negative,
the state of maximal entropy for fixed first and second
moments is Gaussian [24]. In particular, if Alice and Bob
share a state ρAB, they can bound its entropy from its
covariance matrix, that is, H(ρAB) ≤ H(ρ˜AB). Using
similar arguments, it can be seen that the same property
is fulfilled by probability distributions, i.e.,
∆˜H(X) = H(X‖X˜), (12)
where
H(X‖X˜) =
∑
x
p (x)dx log
(
p (x)
p˜ (x)
)
. (13)
Third, the relative entropy (11) never increases after
the application of a trace-preserving map (or a stochastic
map in the classical case). That is, for any of those maps,
denoted by T , and any two states, ρ1 and ρ2,
H(ρ1||ρ2) ≥ H(T (ρ1)||T (ρ2)). (14)
This obviously imply
∆˜H(A) ≥ ∆˜H(T (A)). (15)
for any Gaussian trace preserving channel T , and for any
quantum state or classical random variable A.
To prove the optimality of Gaussian attacks, we first
show that for fixed first and second moments, the Gaus-
sian attack maximizes Eve’s information, χ(X : E). In
order to give the maximally possible information to Eve,
one has to consider that the global state shared by Alice,
Bob and Eve is pure. Then,
∆˜χ(X : E) = ∆˜H(E)− ∆˜H(E|X)
= ∆˜H(AB) − ∆˜H(AB|X)
= ∆˜H(AB) − ∆˜H(AB) + ∆˜H(X), (16)
where we first use the fact that the global state is pure
and then (9). Now, since the channel AB → AB defined
by the X-measurement is Gaussian, ∆˜H(AB)−∆˜H(AB)
is not negative. This, together with (10), implies that
∆˜χ(X : E) = χ˜(X : E)− χ(X : E) ≥ 0, (17)
so the Gaussian attack maximizes Eve’s information for
fixed first and second moments.
Furthemore, the mutual information between Alice
and Bob is minimized if Eve’s attack is Gaussian: one
has
∆˜I(X : Y ) = ∆˜H(X) + ∆˜H(Y )− ∆˜H(XY ) ≤ 0 (18)
The first term is null since Alice’s modulation is Gaus-
sian, and the difference of the last two terms is negative,
following from (15), for the map XY → Y . The opti-
mality of Gaussian attacks is therefore proved. A very
similar argument can be used to prove the optimality of
these attacks with respect to Eq. (6).
It is important to stress here that most of the known
bounds on the secret-key rate, including Eqs. (4) and
(6), were introduced for finite-dimensional systems, so in
4principle they should be carefully applied to the contin-
uous case. However, in Ref. [15], it is shown that the
sliced-reconciliation CV protocol of [10] achieves the rate
(4) for the case of collective attacks. This result has to
be combined with the fact that, for discrete variable sys-
tems as well as for continuous variable systems, collective
attacks are the most powerful general attacks, [18]. This
means that the bounds considered in this article actually
provide general security bounds for CV systems. The ex-
plicit computation of these bounds for the Gaussian case,
now proven to be optimal, can be found in [25].
Before concluding, we would like to comment on the re-
cent related results of [23]. There, it was shown that, for
a given covariance matrix, the state with minimal distill-
able secret-key rate is Gaussian, assuming the distillable
secret-key rate is a continuous functional. This implies
that, up to the continuity assumption, Alice and Bob, for
fixed first and second moments, can safely assume their
state to be Gaussian, whenever they are able to apply any
protocol. This result is very interesting and satisfactory
from a theoretical point of view. However, one should be
careful when applying it to a practical scenario. Indeed,
the distillable secret-key rate is defined with respect to
the optimal protocol. However, the optimal protocol can
be very challenging from a practical point of view. For
instance, it may include local coherent and non Gaussian
operations among several copies of the state. In particu-
lar, it may be quite different from the realistic protocol
considered here, where the techniques (measurements)
used for the correlation distribution are fixed, and exper-
imentally feasible. Thus, one cannot directly apply the
results of [23] to the considered protocols and conclude
that the optimal collective attack is Gaussian.
We have studied the security limits for the CV QKD
protocols proposed in [6] and [8], using the recently ob-
tained lower bounds on the secret-key rate under collec-
tive and general attacks, and we have proven the opti-
mality of Gaussian attacks for these bounds.
In order to improve the derived security conditions,
note that we have always studied the situation in which
Alice and Bob use one-way reconciliation protocols. Two-
way communication protocols should be analyzed as well,
to completely solve the problem of secret key extraction.
Such protocols (e.g. CASCADE [26]) have already being
used in key distribution experiments [9] or in the scheme
proposed in [7], even if the security analysis for these
cases is only preliminary yet.
Note added: The optimality of Gaussian attacks has
been also proven using different techniques in [27].
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